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Note
CHURCH V. STATE: RESOLVING ONE PROBLEM BUT RAISING
ANOTHER—ADDRESSING THE USE OF THE SURVEILLANCE
LOCATION PRIVILEGE AND THE LIMITED REMAND
DAVID J. MARTIN*
State,1

In Church v.
the Maryland Court of Appeals considered
whether a surveillance location privilege exists that allows undercover
police officers to refuse to disclose the location of their observation posts at
trial.2 The court held that such a privilege exists,3 but that before it can be
applied the State must demonstrate that it has a legitimate interest in not
disclosing the location that outweighs the defendant‘s interest in freely
cross-examining his or her accusers.4 The court‘s decision to place the
burden of proving the privilege‘s applicability on the prosecution
adequately protects the defendant‘s Sixth Amendment right to confront his
or her accusers.5 But while the court correctly concluded that defense
counsel preserved the issue for appeal,6 the court erred in issuing a limited
remand that allowed the prosecution to satisfy its burden of proof after it
failed to do so at trial.7 Rather, the court should have issued a new trial
because the error violated the defendant‘s Sixth Amendment rights under
the Confrontation Clause.8 The court‘s decision to order a limited remand
under these circumstances demonstrates that clearer guidelines are needed
to control the use of that remedy.9
I.

THE CASE

On January 12, 2006, undercover police officer Christopher Kintop
was monitoring approximately twelve individuals who had convened along
Tyler Avenue in Annapolis‘s Robinwood community.10 While watching
the group through binoculars from a hidden location, Kintop observed a
Copyright © 2010 by David J. Martin.
* David Martin is a second-year student at the University of Maryland School of Law and a
staff member for the Maryland Law Review. The author wishes to thank Professor George Burns
for sharing his expertise on Maryland criminal procedure. The author is also very grateful to the
members of the Maryland Law Review editorial board for their insightful feedback.
1. 408 Md. 650, 971 A.2d 280 (2009).
2. Id. at 653–54, 971 A.2d at 282.
3. Id. at 668, 971 A.2d at 290.
4. Id. at 670–73, 971 A.2d at 291–93.
5. See infra Part IV.A.
6. See infra Part IV.B.
7. See infra Part IV.C.
8. See infra Part IV.C.
9. See infra Part IV.D.
10. Church v. State, 408 Md. 650, 654, 971 A.2d 280, 282 (2009).
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man whom he later identified as Kyeron Michael Church give a woman
small white rocks in exchange for money.11 Kintop relayed this
information to other officers in his unit who then apprehended Church.12
Once detained, the officers found $600 in cash on his person and discovered
a plastic bag containing cocaine where he had been on the ground.13
Church was charged with possession with intent to distribute a controlled
dangerous substance and possession of a controlled dangerous substance.14
At Church‘s trial, the State made a motion in limine, asking the court
to ―prohibit the Defense from asking [Kintop] or having the State disclose
the actual location of where th[e] surveillance was taking place.‖15 In
response, defense counsel suggested that Church‘s inability to discover
Kintop‘s exact surveillance location would be ―very prejudicial‖ to
Church‘s rights.16 When the trial judge17 asked defense counsel what he
wanted to know, he replied, ―I‘d like to know exactly, well first of all, I‘d
like to know where [Kintop] was.‖18 Defense counsel further stated, ―I‘d
like to know how far he was from my client [and] if he was using
binoculars.‖19 The State indicated that Kintop could testify that he had an
unobstructed view of Church‘s actions, but also argued that a qualified
privilege not to reveal an officer‘s concealed surveillance location permitted
it to keep Kintop‘s exact vantage point undisclosed.20
The trial court ruled ―that a qualified privilege not to disclose the exact
location would be appropriate,‖21 but also noted that defense counsel

11. Id. That evening, Church was wearing dark clothes and a black balaclava, which allowed
Kintop to set him apart from the rest of the group. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 655, 971 A.2d at 282 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
16. Id. at 659, 971 A.2d at 285 (internal quotation marks omitted).
17. Judge William C. Mulford, II, presided over Church‘s jury trial in the Anne Arundel
County Circuit Court. Id. at 650, 971 A.2d at 280.
18. Id. at 659, 971 A.2d at 285 (internal quotation marks omitted).
19. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
20. Id. at 655, 971 A.2d at 282. The State cited Johnson v. State, 148 Md. App. 364, 811
A.2d 898 (2002), cert. denied, 374 Md. 83, 821 A.2d 898 (2003), in support of this contention.
Church, 408 Md. at 655, 971 A.2d at 282 (citing Johnson, 148 Md. App. 364, 811 A.2d 898).
When the trial judge asked the State where Kintop had been located, the State replied:
To tell you the truth, Your Honor, I did not ask him the specific location because I
don‘t want to know it at this point. But I can tell you that what he has told me is that he
had an unobstructed view of what Mr. Church was doing and that there was nothing
that was impairing his vision.
Id., 971 A.2d at 282–83.
21. Church, 408 Md. at 655, 971 A.2d at 283.
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―should be given wide latitude to cross-examine the officer to what he saw,
sight-lines, angles, lighting, time of day it might have been, whether there
were any obstructions, question his memory or any potential bias.‖22 In
response to this ruling defense counsel said, ―[v]ery well.‖23
After this, defense counsel kept his questions regarding Kintop‘s
surveillance location in accordance with the ruling.24 For example, he
asked, ―And I don‘t want to know where your location was, but I do want to
ask you how was the lighting like in the area where you were set up to
observe?‖25
A jury convicted Church on both counts and he was sentenced to ten
years in prison without parole.26 Church appealed his conviction to the
Court of Special Appeals, arguing that the trial court‘s ruling on the motion
in limine prejudiced him because he could not cross-examine Kintop about
his exact surveillance location.27 The Court of Appeals granted certiorari,
on its own initiative and before the Court of Special Appeals decided the
appeal, to address whether the trial court erred in ruling that the State did
not have to disclose the exact location from which Kintop observed the
alleged drug transaction.28
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Three actively developing areas of Maryland criminal procedure are as
follows: (1) the potential existence of a surveillance location privilege that
would permit undercover police officers to refuse to disclose the location of
their observation posts;29 (2) the standard for when an objection to a ruling
on a motion in limine will preserve the issue for appellate review;30 and (3)
the propriety of using the limited remand remedy to allow the prosecution
to correct errors it committed during a trial.31 If a defendant is subjected to

22. Id. The trial judge added this caveat to his in limine ruling: ―So I will grant the State‘s
motion in part and I think actually I‘m going to have to just judge it as it comes up. I‘ll have to
rely on counsel to be close as you ask your questions.‖ Id. at 656, 971 A.2d at 283 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
23. Id. at 656, 971 A.2d at 283 (internal quotation marks omitted).
24. Id. at 661, 971 A.2d at 286.
25. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
26. Id. at 656, 971 A.2d at 283.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See infra Part II.A–B.
30. See infra Part II.C.
31. See infra Part II.D.
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a prejudicial error at trial, he or she is entitled to the issuance of a new
trial.32
A. The Surveillance Location Privilege Derived from the Common-Law
Informer’s Privilege, and Allows the Prosecution to Withhold the
Location of an Undercover Officer’s Observation Post at Trial
The surveillance location privilege permits the prosecution to refuse to
disclose the location of an undercover police observation post.33 In most
jurisdictions, it is a qualified privilege, only available when States can
demonstrate that their interest in keeping the location secret outweighs a
defendant‘s interest in an unobstructed cross-examination of his or her
accuser.34
The surveillance location privilege derived from the analogous
informer‘s privilege, which allows the prosecution to withhold from
disclosing the identities of confidential police informants at trial.35 The
deeply rooted informer‘s privilege originated in the English common law
and is designed to encourage a flow of information about criminal behavior
from members of the public to law enforcement.36 In the 1800s, application
of the informer‘s privilege began to proliferate in American common law.37
In 1957, the Supreme Court of the United States addressed the informer‘s
privilege in Roviaro v. United States.38 There, the Court articulated a
balancing test to determine whether disclosure of an informant‘s identity is
proper, stating that courts must weigh ―the public interest in protecting the
flow of information against the individual‘s right to prepare his defense.‖39
The Maryland Court of Appeals has stated that when the informer‘s

32. See infra Part II.E.
33. Johnson v. State, 148 Md. App. 364, 368, 811 A.2d 898, 900 (2002), cert. denied, 374
Md. 83, 821 A.2d 370 (2003).
34. Id. As a general rule, testimonial exemptions are limited to situations where a substantial
individual interest that outweighs the public interest in the search for truth must be protected.
United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950).
35. United States v. Green, 670 F.2d 1148, 1155 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
36. Id. Rex v. Akers was one of the first cases to apply the informer‘s privilege in the English
common law. See (1790) 170 Eng. Rep. 850, 850 (finding that the defendant was not permitted to
discover the identity of the person who notified law enforcement of a smuggling operation).
37. See United States v. Moses, 27 F. Cas. 5 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1827) (No. 15,825) (finding that
an officer was not bound to reveal the identity of an anonymous tipster from whom he had
received information that led to an arrest); Worthington v. Scribner, 109 Mass. 487, 489 (1872)
(―Courts of justice therefore will not compel or allow the discovery of [an informant‘s identity],
either by the subordinate officer to whom it is given, by the informer himself, or by any other
person, without the permission of the government.‖).
38. 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
39. Id. at 62.
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privilege is invoked, ―trial courts must apply the Roviaro balancing test in
each case.‖40
In the 1981 case of United States v. Green,41 the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit established a qualified
surveillance location privilege underpinned by the same policy
considerations supporting the existence of the informer‘s privilege.42 The
Green court applied the surveillance location privilege to a suppression
hearing, but one year later the court expanded the application of the
privilege to trial proceedings.43
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland first recognized the
existence of the qualified surveillance location privilege in a 2002 case,
Johnson v. State.44 In that case, the State filed a motion in limine to prevent
the location of an observation post from being disclosed at trial, as police
were still using the post and the private citizen who allowed police to use
the property feared retaliation for his or her assistance.45 Additionally, the
defendant had not shown how determining the officer‘s exact location
would further his defense, as the officer had already testified regarding the
conditions affecting his sight line.46 The Johnson court used a balancing
test and held that the surveillance location privilege was applicable in that
case because the State‘s demonstrated interest in concealing the location of
the observation post trumped the defendant‘s interest in disclosing it.47
B. The Surveillance Location Privilege Is Widely Adopted, Yet Courts
Use Varying Tests in Determining the Privilege’s Applicability
While the surveillance location privilege is widely adopted, not all
jurisdictions apply the same test when determining its propriety.48 Courts
40. Warrick v. State, 326 Md. 696, 701, 607 A.2d 24, 26 (1992).
41. 670 F.2d 1148.
42. Id. at 1155 (―We believe that policy justifications analogous to those underlying the wellestablished informer‘s privilege support a qualified privilege protecting police surveillance
locations from disclosure. Like confidential informants, hidden observation posts may often
prove to be useful law enforcement tools, so long as they remain secret.‖); see also Roviaro, 353
U.S. at 59–60 (weighing the State‘s interest in receiving information from the public against the
defendant‘s fair trial rights to determine whether disclosure of an informant‘s identity is proper);
Warrick, 326 Md. at 701, 607 A.2d at 26–27 (adopting the informer‘s privilege balancing test set
forth in Roviaro and the policy rationale underpinning it).
43. United States v. Harley, 682 F.2d 1018, 1020 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
44. 148 Md. App. 364, 368, 811 A.2d 898, 900 (2002), cert. denied, 374 Md. 83, 821 A.2d
370 (2003).
45. Id. at 366–67, 811 A.2d at 899–900.
46. Id. at 372–73, 811 A.2d at 903.
47. Id. at 371–73, 811 A.2d at 902–03.
48. See Anderson v. United States, 607 A.2d 490, 496 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (requiring the
defendant to make a threshold showing that he needed the observing officer‘s surveillance
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typically engage in a balancing test weighing the State‘s interest in nondisclosure against the defendant‘s Confrontation Clause right to crossexamine his or her accuser.49 Although there is no consensus as to whether
the burden of proving or disproving the privilege‘s applicability should fall
50
on the prosecution or the defendant, jurisdictions have reached a
consensus to use balancing tests because the Confrontation Clause requires
that a defendant‘s right of confrontation be protected.51
1. Some Jurisdictions Place the Burden of Disproving the
Privilege’s Applicability on the Criminal Defendant
Some jurisdictions require that a defendant disprove the privilege‘s
applicability by demonstrating that disclosure of the surveillance location is
material and/or necessary to his or her defense. In People v. Montgomery,52
the California Court of Appeals stated that ―[i]n a criminal case the
defendant must at least show how the [surveillance location] information
affects the preparation or presentation of his [or her] defense.‖53 The court
further stated that it should first ―ask the defendant to make a prima facie
showing for disclosure.‖54 Other courts have gone further, finding that a
defendant can only overcome the privilege by demonstrating that disclosure
of the surveillance location is necessary to successfully argue his or her
defense.55
location to conduct a defense and that the information was not available by other means before
conducting a balancing test); State v. Laws, 621 A.2d 526, 530 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993)
(conducting a balancing test and explaining that there may be an exception where the only
evidence is that of the surveillance officer); Hollins v. Commonwealth, 450 S.E.2d 397, 399–400
(Va. Ct. App. 1994) (employing the D.C. Circuit‘s analysis).
49. See United States v. Cintolo, 818 F.2d 980, 1002 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding that a qualified
surveillance location privilege exists, and that courts applying it must balance the State‘s interest
in non-disclosure against the defendant‘s need for the information in arguing a defense); Haider v.
Dir. of Corr., 992 F. Supp. 1192, 1197 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (applying a case-by-case balancing test
weighing the confidentiality of the information sought by the defendant against the interest of
justice).
50. See infra Part II.B.1–2.
51. See infra Part II.B.3.
52. 252 Cal. Rptr. 779 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
53. Id. at 784.
54. Id. at 785; see also Commonwealth v. Santiago, 631 A.2d 1323, 1327 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1993) (―It is the defendant . . . who has the burden of demonstrating to the trial court that the
[surveillance location] is material and that disclosure is in the interest of justice.‖).
55. See Cintolo v. United States, 818 F.2d 980, 1002 (1st Cir. 1987) (stating that ―our review
of this ruling of the district court comes down to a determination of whether the appellant
demonstrated an authentic ‗necessity,‘ given the circumstances, to overbear the qualified
[surveillance location] privilege‖); Bueno v. United States, 761 A.2d 856, 859 (D.C. 2000) (―A
defendant who has requested the precise location of a police surveillance post must first show that
he needs the information to conduct his defense before any balancing test is applied.‖).
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2. Other Jurisdictions Place the Burden of Proving the Privilege’s
Applicability on the Prosecution
Some jurisdictions take the position that the prosecution must prove
the privilege‘s applicability by demonstrating that disclosure of the
surveillance location would compromise other prosecutions or would
endanger lives or property.56 In State v. Garcia,57 the Supreme Court of
New Jersey took this position, holding that once the State had met this
initial burden, then the defendant could request an evidentiary hearing to
attempt to show substantial need for the information.58 The Garcia court
upheld the defendant‘s conviction because he had already been afforded an
evidentiary hearing to show substantial need for the observing officer‘s
location.59
3. The Confrontation Clause Derived from the Common-Law Right
of Confrontation, and Grants Criminal Defendants the Right to
Cross-Examine Witnesses Appearing Before Them at Trial
Courts that find the surveillance location privilege inapplicable often
justify their decision by emphasizing the importance of the defendant‘s
constitutional rights under the Confrontation Clause.60 By preventing a
criminal defendant from asking where his or her accuser‘s undercover
observation post was located, the surveillance location privilege restricts a
criminal defendant‘s constitutional right to cross-examine witnesses.61
The Confrontation Clause states that a criminal defendant shall have
the right ―to be confronted with the witnesses against him.‖ 62 The Clause
was added to the Constitution to maintain the common-law tradition of
adversarial testing, which allows a defendant to advocate for his innocence
by rebutting a witness‘s live testimony.63 This right is rooted in the English
common-law system, under which courts would sometimes use the civil law
practice of having witnesses testify prior to trial.64 The testimony recorded

56. State v. Garcia, 618 A.2d 326, 332 (N.J. 1993).
57. 618 A.2d 326.
58. Id. at 333.
59. Id. at 334.
60. See, e.g., United States v. Gazie, No. 83-1851, 1986 U.S. App. LEXIS 23026, at *29 (6th
Cir. Feb. 26, 1986) (stating that ―in some instances, information sought by a defendant may be so
critical that his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation would outweigh the government‘s
asserted needs for the privilege,‖ and that the ―fundamental importance of the defendant‘s right to
a fair trial, in those cases, would have to be honored‖ (emphasis omitted)).
61. Anderson v. United States, 607 A.2d 490, 495 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
62. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
63. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 49 (2004).
64. Id. at 43.
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at these pre-trial examinations—referred to as Marian examinations—was
admissible as evidence in court.65 When this sort of testimony was
presented against the defendant and the defendant had not been present at
the examination, the defendant‘s ability to challenge the witness‘s
assertions was severely undercut.66 In response, English law created a right
to confrontation to protect a defendant‘s ability to receive a fair trial.67 This
safeguard was inherited by the United States legal system, and codified
when the First Congress incorporated the Confrontation Clause into the
Sixth Amendment.68 In 1965, the Supreme Court held in Pointer v. Texas69
that ―the Sixth Amendment‘s right of an accused to confront the witnesses
against him is . . . a fundamental right and is made obligatory on the States
by the Fourteenth Amendment.‖70 Maryland codified this right in Article
21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, which states that ―in all criminal
prosecutions, every man hath a right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses
against him [and] to examine the witnesses for and against him on oath.‖71
C. An Objection to a Ruling on a Motion In Limine Will Be Preserved
for Review If the Defendant States His Objection or Preferred
Alternative Outcome When the Trial Judge Issues the Ruling
While Maryland Rule 4-323(a) governs objections made to rulings on
the admissibility of evidence,72 Maryland Rule 4-323(c) dictates whether an
objection to any other ruling or order (for example, rulings on the exclusion
of evidence) will preserve the issue for appellate review.73 Rule 4-323(c)
states that ―[f]or purposes of review by the trial court or on appeal of any
other ruling or order, it is sufficient that a party, at the time the ruling or
order is made or sought, makes known to the court the action that the party
desires the court to take or the objection to the action of the court.‖74
Applying Rule 4-323(c), the Court of Appeals of Maryland has stated that
65. Id. at 44. Marian examinations refer to a method of interrogation conducted under the
English bail and committal statutes passed during the rule of Queen Mary. Davis v. Washington,
547 U.S. 813, 835–36 (2006). The statutes allowed for ex parte interrogations of witnesses,
whose testimony could be transcribed, delivered to judges, and then submitted into evidence. Id.
66. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44 (detailing the great trial of Sir Walter Raleigh).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 49.
69. 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
70. Id. at 403.
71. MD. CONST. DECL. OF RTS. art. 21.
72. MD. R. 4-323(a).
73. MD. R. 4-323(c).
74. Id. Additionally, Maryland Rule 4-323(d) states that ―[a] formal exception to a ruling or
order of the court is not necessary.‖ MD. R. 4-323(d).
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―when a trial judge, in response to a motion in limine, makes a ruling to
exclude evidence that is clearly intended to be the final word on the
matter . . . and the proponent of the evidence makes a contemporaneous
objection, his objection ordinarily is preserved.‖75 If a party opposing the
motion acquiesces to a court‘s ruling and fails to make a sufficient
objection, then the issue will not be preserved for review.76 The Court of
Appeals addressed this situation in Watkins v. State,77 where it held that a
defense attorney‘s response of ―[t]hank you‖ and ―[t]hat‘s all I have‖ to the
judge‘s denial of his motion to present evidence did not constitute an
objection.78 In Beverly v. State,79 however, the Court of Appeals explained
that a party‘s deference to a trial judge‘s ruling does not necessarily equate
to acquiescence if the party has already objected and vigorously argued the
matter.80
D. A Limited Remand Is Only Proper If the Issue to Be Addressed Is
Subsidiary to the Criminal Trial and Further Proceedings Will
Advance the Purposes of Justice
Under Maryland Rule 8-604(d), appellate courts may remand a case to
lower courts if they conclude ―that the substantial merits of a case will not
be determined by affirming, reversing or modifying the judgment, or that
justice will be served by permitting further proceedings.‖81 In 1972, the
Court of Appeals addressed the applicability of the limited remand in Gill v.
State,82 holding that the remedy may be used to ―correct procedures
subsidiary to the criminal trial,‖ but can never be used ―to rectify prejudicial
errors committed during the trial itself.‖83 In Gill, the trial court erred in
admitting the defendant‘s confession because the prosecution had failed to
meet its burden of proving that it was voluntary.84 Recognizing this error,
the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland issued a limited remand to
determine the issue of voluntariness after taking additional testimony.85
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Court of Special Appeals,
explaining that a limited remand would be insufficient because regardless of
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Prout v. State, 311 Md. 348, 357, 535 A.2d 445, 449 (1988).
Watkins v. State, 328 Md. 95, 100, 613 A.2d 379, 381 (1992).
328 Md. 95, 613 A.2d 379.
Id. at 99–100, 613 A.2d at 381 (internal quotation marks omitted).
349 Md. 106, 707 A.2d 91 (1998).
Id. at 118, 707 A.2d at 97.
MD. R. 8-604(d).
265 Md. 350, 289 A.2d 575 (1972).
Id. at 357, 289 A.2d at 579.
Id. at 353, 289 A.2d at 577.
Id. at 354, 289 A.2d at 577.
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the trial judge‘s admissibility finding, the determination of innocence or
guilt would remain the same; thus, the proper remedy was to grant the
defendant a new trial.86 The Court of Appeals has generally followed the
rule in Gill, only issuing a limited remand when correcting errors subsidiary
to the substantive issues of a trial.87 If the higher court recognizes an error
that prejudiced the defendant‘s fair trial rights, then the appropriate remedy
is not a limited remand, but rather a new trial.88 The Court of Appeals
recognized this principle in Mitchell v. State.89 There, the court explained
that a ―[l]imited remand cannot be used to correct procedural defects at the
trial level when the procedure involved is so intertwined with the
defendant‘s constitutional right to counsel that a limited remand would
cause unfair prejudice.‖90 The Court of Appeals has also noted that a
limited remand may not be used to grant parties that fail to meet their
evidentiary burdens in a completed suppression proceeding a chance to
reopen that hearing, as doing so would give the party ―a second bite at the
apple.‖91
E. Appellate Courts Must Order a New Trial If a Defendant Is
Prejudiced by an Error at Trial
While criminal defendants are not entitled to receive new trials in
response to harmless errors,92 the proper remedy for prejudicial errors
86. Id. at 359–60, 289 A.2d at 580.
87. See Patrick v. State, 329 Md. 24, 37, 617 A.2d 215, 221 (1992) (ordering a limited
remand to determine whether the prosecution‘s failure to disclose polygraph results was
prejudicial to the criminal defendant); Warrick v. State, 302 Md. 162, 173–74, 486 A.2d 189, 195
(1985) (finding that a limited remand was an appropriate remedy because the issue to be reexamined—whether the State failed to disclose discoverable information—was an inquiry
―collateral to the trial‖).
88. Mitchell v. State, 337 Md. 509, 517, 654 A.2d 1309, 1313 (1995). In Mitchell, the Court
of Appeals stated that in determining the propriety of a limited remand in a criminal trial, ―[t]he
controlling factor is . . . whether the error adversely affected the defendant‘s right to a fair trial.‖
Id.
89. 337 Md. 509, 654 A.2d 1309.
90. Id. at 518, 654 A.2d at 1313–14.
91. Southern v. State, 371 Md. 93, 110, 807 A.2d 13, 23 (2002). In Southern, the Court of
Appeals stated that the limited remand should not have been granted because the remedy allowed
the State to introduce evidence on whether police had probable cause to stop and arrest the
defendant after the State failed to do so at trial. Id. at 96, 807 A.2d at 15. The court emphasized
that in issuing the limited remand, the Court of Special Appeals ―departed from the practice of
appellate courts to reverse the judgment in a case where the State has failed to sustain its burden
of proof in a motion to suppress.‖ Id. at 110–11, 807 A.2d at 23. The court also speculated that
were the roles reversed and the defendant had been the party that failed to present sufficient
evidence at trial, he likely would not have been afforded the same opportunity to introduce new
evidence and strengthen his case. Id. at 110, 807 A.2d at 23.
92. Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638, 651, 350 A.2d 665, 674 (1976).
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committed during the trial is the issuance of a new trial.93 Errors that
violate a defendant‘s right to a fair trial are generally deemed prejudicial.94
The Court of Appeals has recognized that the defendant‘s interest in
―fundamental fairness‖ is a relevant consideration when deciding whether a
reversible error occurred.95 Additionally, if the error may have influenced
the jury‘s determination of guilt, then the defendant should receive a new
trial.96 The Court of Appeals emphasized this point in Williams v. State,97
explaining that ―[u]pon an independent review of the record, we must be
able to declare, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error in no way
influenced the verdict; otherwise, reversal is required.‖98
III. THE COURT‘S REASONING
In Church v. State,99 the Court of Appeals of Maryland issued a
limited remand without affirming or reversing the lower court‘s decision
and held that before the prosecution can invoke the surveillance location
privilege, it must demonstrate that application of the privilege will protect a
legitimate State interest that outweighs the defendant‘s Sixth Amendment
right to confrontation.100 Judge Adkins, writing for the majority, began by
discussing whether defense counsel‘s objection to the trial judge‘s ruling on
the motion in limine was sufficient to preserve the issue for appeal.101 The
State cited Watkins v. State102 in support of its contention that Church‘s
counsel failed to preserve the issue by acquiescing to the trial judge‘s ruling

93. Id. at 659, 350 A.2d at 678.
94. See Mitchell, 337 Md. at 517, 654 A.2d at 1313 (finding that a new trial rather than a
limited remand was necessary to determine whether defendant had waived his constitutional right
to counsel by inaction); see also Martinez v. State, 309 Md. 124, 136, 522 A.2d 950, 956 (1987)
(finding that defendant was entitled to a new trial where the record did not indicate that he had
waived his constitutional right to a jury trial).
95. Austin v. State, 253 Md. 313, 319, 252 A.2d 797, 800 (1969).
96. See Gill v. State, 265 Md. 350, 359, 289 A.2d 575, 580 (1972) (finding that a new trial
was necessary to re-determine a confession‘s voluntariness because the jury must have the
opportunity to consider the evidence relating to a confession‘s voluntariness before deciding
whether the defendant is guilty or innocent).
97. 364 Md. 160, 771 A.2d 1082 (2001).
98. Id. at 179, 771 A.2d at 1093; see also Dorsey, 276 Md. at 659, 350 A.2d at 678 (stating
that the ―reviewing court must thus be satisfied that there is no reasonable possibility that the
evidence complained of—whether erroneously admitted or excluded—may have contributed to
the rendition of the guilty verdict‖).
99. 408 Md. 650, 971 A.2d 280 (2009).
100. Id. at 672–73, 971 A.2d at 292–93.
101. Id. at 656–57, 971 A.2d at 283.
102. 328 Md. 95, 613 A.2d 379 (1992).
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on the motion.103 Church‘s counsel rebutted this argument by citing
Beverly v. State,104 where the Court of Appeals distinguished Watkins and
rejected the State‘s argument that a defendant had failed to preserve an
issue for appeal by deferring to the trial court‘s interpretation of the law.105
The majority then found that the actions of Church‘s counsel more closely
resembled those of the defense counsel in Beverly than those of the defense
counsel in Watkins.106 It recognized that Church‘s counsel clearly stated
his objection to the application of the privilege and that his failure to ask
additional questions regarding Kintop‘s exact location after the trial judge
had issued his ruling on the motion was not acquiescence, but rather
appropriate deference to the court‘s decision.107 The majority closed its
discussion of the preservation issue by noting that Maryland Rule 4323(a)—under which an objection to the admission of evidence is waived
unless it is made at the time the evidence is offered or as soon as grounds
for an objection materialize—was not applicable in this case because the
trial judge did not rule to admit evidence, but rather ruled to exclude it.108
Judge Adkins then addressed the application of the surveillance
location privilege in light of Church‘s right to confront the witnesses
appearing against him under the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.109 Both
parties agreed that the surveillance location privilege allows for the nondisclosure of a police officer‘s whereabouts if the State‘s interest in keeping
the location secret outweighs the defendant‘s Sixth Amendment right to
confront witnesses testifying against him or her.110 But the parties
disagreed as to who carries the burden of proving the privilege‘s
applicability.111 The majority concluded that Maryland state courts cannot
apply the privilege unless the State demonstrates that doing so would
protect a legitimate State interest, and held that the State failed to make a
sufficient demonstration in this case.112 The majority further found that the
application of the surveillance location privilege required the use of a

103.
379).
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Church, 408 Md. at 656–57, 971 A.2d at 283–84 (citing Watkins, 328 Md. 95, 613 A.2d
349 Md. 106, 707 A.2d 91 (1998).
Church, 408 Md. at 657, 971 A.2d at 284 (citing Beverly, 349 Md. 106, 707 A.2d 91).
Id. at 660, 971 A.2d at 285–86.
Id. at 661, 971 A.2d at 286.
Id. at 662, 971 A.2d at 287.
Id. at 662–63, 971 A.2d at 287–88.
Id., 971 A.2d at 287.
Id.
Id. at 663, 971 A.2d at 287–88.

2010]

CHURCH v. STATE

193

balancing test.113 The majority also cited Johnson v. State114 and three
cases from the D.C. Circuit that had used similar guidelines in applying the
surveillance location privilege to support its finding.115
The majority then acknowledged that several other jurisdictions had
ruled that the burden falls on the defendant to prove why the surveillance
location privilege should not be applied.116 The majority rejected this
interpretation and placed the initial burden of proving the privilege‘s
applicability on the State, explaining that ―such burden allocation
appropriately safeguards the rudimentary right of a defendant to crossexamination of witnesses against him.‖117 The majority then supported its
decision by noting that the State had failed to prove that it had any
legitimate interest in preventing disclosure, as it had not shown that
Kintop‘s surveillance location was still being used by police or that any
harm would result from revealing it; thus, the State had provided no
interests for the court to balance against defendant Church‘s interest in
disclosure.118
The majority issued a limited remand without affirming or reversing
and concluded that a new trial was not necessary if (1) the State could
demonstrate to the trial court that police were still using Kintop‘s
surveillance location or that the interests of someone associated with the
location would be threatened by revealing it, and (2) the trial court
determined that the State‘s interests outweighed Church‘s right to
confrontation.119 If the State failed to make either of these showings, then a

113. Id. at 664, 971 A.2d at 288 (citing Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 59 (1957)).
114. 148 Md. App. 364, 811 A.2d 898 (2002), cert. denied, 374 Md. 83, 821 A.2d 370 (2003).
115. Church, 408 Md. at 664–67, 971 A.2d at 288–90 (citing United States v. Green, 670 F.2d
1148, 1155–57 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (establishing a surveillance location privilege, based on the
informer‘s privilege, that could be used in suppression hearings); United States v. Harley, 682
F.2d 1018, 1020 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (applying the surveillance location privilege to a trial
proceeding and noting that it requires balancing the State‘s interests against the defendant‘s
interests); United States v. Foster, 986 F.2d 541, 543–44 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (finding that the
surveillance location privilege could not be applied where knowledge of the exact surveillance
point would allow the defendant to challenge the undercover officer‘s memory and perception)).
116. Id. at 669–70, 971 A.2d at 291 (citing People v. Montgomery, 252 Cal. Rptr. 779, 785
(Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (finding that in determining whether to compel the prosecution to reveal an
undercover police officer‘s surveillance location, the defendant must first make a prima facie
showing for disclosure); Bueno v. United States, 761 A.2d 856, 859 (D.C. 2000) (finding that a
defendant must demonstrate that knowledge of an officer‘s surveillance location is necessary to
his or her defense before the court engages in a balancing test); Commonwealth v. Santiago, 631
A.2d 1323, 1327 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (finding that the defendant carries the burden of proving
that disclosure of an officer‘s surveillance location is both material and in the interest of justice)).
117. Id. at 670, 971 A.2d at 292.
118. Id. at 671, 971 A.2d at 292.
119. Id. at 672, 971 A.2d at 292–93.
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new jury trial would be issued.120 The majority concluded its opinion by
noting that the rule governing the use of limited remands in Southern v.
State121 did not apply here because that case involved a suppression
hearing.122
Judge Greene, joined by Chief Judge Bell, wrote a dissenting opinion
arguing that Church was entitled to a new trial because the trial judge
applied the surveillance location privilege absent a showing of a legitimate
State interest.123 Judge Green contended that Southern should apply to this
case because a motion in limine is similar to a motion to suppress evidence
in that they are both requests for a ruling on the admissibility of evidence
before it is offered.124 He noted that in Southern, the Court of Appeals
ruled that a limited remand was improper, as it would have given the State
―‗a second bite at the apple in the same case,‘ rather than ‗permit [the] court
to cure some judicial error that resulted in unfairness to a party.‘‖125 He
then concluded that a new trial was the appropriate remedy because the jury
may have been influenced by defense counsel‘s inability to fully crossexamine Kintop.126
Finally, Judge Murphy wrote a dissenting opinion expressing the view
that defense counsel acquiesced to the motion in limine ruling and thus the
issue was not preserved for review on appeal.127 Judge Murphy
emphasized that in Simmons v. State,128 the Court of Appeals held that a
trial judge‘s ruling on a motion in limine excluding a line of questions is
only preserved for review if the record shows that the judge intended the
ruling to be final.129 Under Judge Murphy‘s view, defense counsel was
required to ask the trial court to reconsider its in limine ruling during
Kintop‘s cross-examination to preserve the issue for review.130

120. Id.
121. 371 Md. 93, 807 A.2d 13 (2002).
122. Church, 408 Md. at 672–73, 971 A.2d at 293.
123. Id. at 673–74, 971 A.2d at 293–94 (Greene, J., dissenting).
124. Id. at 675–76, 971 A.2d at 295. According to Judge Greene, the majority was more
concerned with giving the State an opportunity to invoke the surveillance location privilege than it
was with Church‘s right to a fair trial. Id. at 674, 971 A.2d at 295.
125. Id. at 675, 971 A.2d at 294 (quoting Southern, 371 Md. at 112, 807 A.2d at 24).
126. Id. at 676, 971 A.2d at 295.
127. Id. at 676–77, 971 A.2d at 295–96 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
128. 313 Md. 33, 542 A.2d 1258 (1988).
129. Church, 408 Md. at 676, 971 A.2d at 295. Judge Murphy pointed out that the trial judge
in this case could not have intended his in limine ruling to be final, since he stated, ―I think
actually I‘m going to have to just judge it as it comes up.‖ Id. at 677, 971 A.2d at 295–96
(internal quotation marks omitted).
130. Id. at 677, 971 A.2d at 296.
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IV. ANALYSIS
In Church v. State, the Maryland Court of Appeals held that before the
State can invoke the surveillance location privilege, it must show that its
application will protect a legitimate State interest, and found that a new trial
was not necessary in this case if on remand (1) the prosecution could
demonstrate that non-disclosure would protect such an interest, and (2) the
trial court determined that the State‘s interest in suppression outweighed
any harm to the defendant.131 The court‘s decision to place the burden of
proving the privilege‘s applicability on the prosecution correctly protects
defendants‘ rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Constitution.132
The court also correctly held that defense counsel‘s conduct at trial was
sufficiently vigorous to preserve the surveillance location privilege issue for
appellate review.133 The court erred, however, by issuing a limited remand
because that remedy improperly permitted the prosecution to correct
procedural errors it made at trial that violated the defendant‘s Sixth
Amendment rights.134 Rather than issuing a limited remand, the court
should have granted Church a new trial.135 The court‘s decision
underscores the ambiguity of the limited remand standard and calls for a
revision of the device to ensure the protection of constitutional rights.136
A. The Court’s Decision to Place the Initial Burden of Proving the
Surveillance Location Privilege’s Applicability on the Prosecution
Wisely Safeguards the Defendant’s Sixth Amendment Right to
Confront His Accusers
By placing the initial burden of proving the surveillance location
privilege‘s applicability on the prosecution, the court set a precedent that
adequately protects criminal defendants‘ cross-examination rights. In this
case, the prosecution failed to provide any reason why Officer Kintop‘s
surveillance location should not be disclosed, and claimed that the burden
was on Church to prove why disclosure was necessary for him to argue his
case.137 Placing the burden on the defendant, which would presume the
privilege‘s applicability, would be contrary to a defendant‘s fair trial

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id. at 670–73, 971 A.2d at 291–93 (majority opinion).
See infra Part IV.A.
See infra Part IV.B.
See infra Part IV.C.
See infra Part IV.C.
See infra Part IV.D.
Church v. State, 408 Md. 650, 670, 971 A.2d 280, 291–92 (2009).
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rights.138 As the majority noted in its opinion, public policy considerations
support the use of the privilege where a legitimate State interest is at
stake.139 Considering that both the State and defendants may have valid
reasons to argue for or against the privilege‘s applicability, a balancing test
is an appropriate method for resolving the issue.140 Here, however, where
the prosecution set forth no reason supporting non-disclosure, ―there is no
justification for applying a balancing test.‖141 Thus, the majority‘s decision
to place the initial burden of proving the applicability of the surveillance
location privilege on the prosecution sufficiently safeguards a defendant‘s
rights to cross-examination under the Confrontation Clause.
B. The Court Correctly Held that Defense Counsel Preserved the
Surveillance Location Privilege Issue for Appeal Because He
Vigorously Argued in Support of His Preferred Alternative
Outcome to the Trial Judge’s Ruling
The majority properly resolved a second issue by holding that defense
counsel‘s response to the trial judge‘s ruling on the motion in limine
preserved the issue for appellate review. As soon as the prosecution made
the motion, defense counsel noted that being prevented from asking about
Officer Kintop‘s location would be prejudicial to Church‘s fair trial rights,
and stated, ―I‘d like to know exactly, well first of all, I‘d like to know
where [Kintop] was.‖142 After the trial judge ruled in favor of the
prosecution‘s motion, defense counsel‘s compliance with the ruling did not
amount to acquiescence. As the majority recognized, his deference to the
trial judge‘s decision fell ―within the appropriate bounds of
professionalism . . . in a manner consistent with the court‘s ruling.‖143 By
continuing to argue for disclosure of the location after the ruling, defense

138. See id. (explaining that placing the burden on the prosecution appropriately protects the
defendant‘s rights); see also United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950) (stating that ―we
start with the primary assumption that there is a general duty to give what testimony one is
capable of giving, and that any exemptions which may exist are distinctly exceptional‖).
139. Church, 408 Md. at 669, 971 A.2d at 291.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 671, 971 A.2d at 292.
142. Id. at 659, 971 A.2d at 285 (internal quotation marks omitted).
143. Id. at 661, 971 A.2d at 286. The majority analogized Church‘s counsel‘s conduct to that
of the defense counsel in Beverly v. State, 349 Md. 106, 707 A.2d 91 (1998). Church, 408 Md. at
657–59, 971 A.2d at 284–85. In Beverly, the court found that defense counsel‘s objection to a
motion made by the prosecution preserved the issue for appellate review because ―once [defense
counsel] realized that the court was not going to change its mind, defense counsel, having
vigorously argued the matter, politely continued on with the matter of the day.‖ Beverly, 349 Md.
at 117–18, 707 A.2d at 96–97.
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counsel would have risked agitating the trial judge, who had an interest in
moving the trial forward in accordance with his interpretation of the law.
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Murphy argued that defense counsel‘s
objection was not sufficient to preserve the issue for appellate review.144
First, he pointed to the court‘s language in Prout v. State145 and explained
that an objection will be preserved only if the judge intended that the ruling
be final.146 Next, he argued that the trial judge‘s ruling on the motion in
limine in the present case was not intended to be final and thus the issue
was not preserved for review.147 This conclusion, however, fails to
recognize that while the trial judge‘s language that Judge Murphy pointed
to in his dissenting opinion appears equivocal,148 the trial judge also
appeared to indicate that his decision to rule on the motion in limine was
settled. The judge‘s statement that ―[i]f it appears that [a question] is going
to triangulate or locate the actual place where [Kintop] was I will be
upholding the State‘s motion in limine‖149 demonstrates that even though
he stated that he would judge the questions as they arose, his mind was
made up about what would and what would not be appropriate. Therefore,
the majority correctly held that defense counsel‘s objection to the trial
judge‘s ruling on the motion in limine preserved that issue for appellate
review.
C. The Court Erred in Issuing a Limited Remand, as Church Was
Entitled to a New Trial Because the Lower Court’s Misapplication
of the Surveillance Location Privilege Violated His Sixth
Amendment Right to Confrontation and Constituted Prejudicial
Error
At trial, the prosecution failed to submit any evidence demonstrating
that the State had a legitimate interest in preventing disclosure of Officer
Kintop‘s observation post.150 The prosecution‘s failure to meet its
evidentiary burden meant that the need to engage in a balancing test was
never triggered because there was nothing to balance against the

144. Church, 408 Md. at 676–77, 971 A.2d at 295–96 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
145. 311 Md. 348, 535 A.2d 445 (1988).
146. Church, 408 Md. at 676–77, 971 A.2d at 295–96.
147. Id. When issuing the ruling, the trial judge stated, ―I will grant the State‘s motion in part
and I think actually I‘m going to have to just judge it as it comes up. I‘ll have to rely on counsel
to be close as you ask your questions.‖ Id. at 656, 971 A.2d at 283 (majority opinion) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
148. See id. at 677, 971 A.2d at 295 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (focusing on the language that
discussed judging the evidence ―as it comes up‖).
149. Id. at 655–56, 971 A.2d at 283 (majority opinion).
150. Id. at 670, 971 A.2d at 291.
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defendant‘s interest in disclosure.151 Thus, according to the dissent, Church
was prevented from cross-examining Officer Kintop as to the surveillance
location in violation of his constitutional right under the Confrontation
Clause.152 Violating a criminal defendant‘s constitutional right to crossexamination relates to the substantive issue of the defendant‘s guilt because
restrictions placed on that right may influence the jury‘s determination of
guilt.153 Under the standard set forth by the Court of Appeals in Dorsey v.
State,154 the reviewing court must order a new trial unless it can find ―no
reasonable possibility‖ that erroneously excluded evidence contributed to
the jury‘s verdict.155 It seems plausible that the court‘s decision to bar
Church from determining where Officer Kintop was located may have led
some jury members to believe that Church could not be trusted with this
knowledge and thus to perceive him as potentially dangerous, vengeful, and
presumptively guilty. Thus, it would have been in the interest of
―fundamental fairness‖156 to order a new trial.157
While the majority did not even address Dorsey, it hastily
distinguished the instant case from Southern v. State,158 where the Court of
Appeals held that a limited remand could not be used to reopen a
suppression hearing in the same case because the prosecution failed to meet
its evidentiary burden.159 The majority argued that the Southern rule only
applied to rulings on motions to suppress evidence, and not rulings on
motions in limine.160 As Judge Greene aptly noted in his dissenting
opinion, a ruling on a motion to suppress evidence is analogous to a ruling
on a motion in limine in that they both serve to determine the admissibility
of evidence before it is offered at trial.161 In Southern, the Court of
151. Id. at 671, 971 A.2d at 292.
152. Id. at 674, 971 A.2d at 294 (Greene, J., dissenting).
153. Id. at 676, 971 A.2d at 295.
154. 276 Md. 638, 350 A.2d 665 (1976).
155. Id. at 659, 350 A.2d at 678.
156. See Austin v. State, 253 Md. 313, 319, 252 A.2d 797, 800 (1969) (ordering defendant a
new trial where evidence was erroneously excluded ―if for no other reason than that of
fundamental fairness to the accused‖).
157. See Church, 408 Md. at 676, 971 A.2d at 295 (Greene, J., dissenting) (―Fairness dictates
that Church receive a new trial.‖).
158. 371 Md. 93, 807 A.2d 13 (2002).
159. Church, 408 Md. at 672–73, 971 A.2d at 293 (majority opinion) (citing Southern, 371
Md. at 105, 807 A.2d at 20).
160. Id.
161. Id. at 676, 971 A.2d at 295 (Greene, J., dissenting). Judge Greene explained that
―[s]imilar to the situation in Southern, the State, here, failed to meet its burden of establishing any
grounds for Officer Kintop to refuse to disclose the location of his surveillance post.‖ Id. He then
concluded that ―[a]s in Southern, it would be unfair, in effect, to remand the case for the limited
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Appeals remanded the case to the circuit court for a new trial.162 Church
also should have received a new trial, as we cannot know whether the trial
court‘s prejudicial error influenced the jury‘s decision.163
At first glance, the majority‘s decision to issue a limited remand is
understandable, as the prosecution would be able to satisfy its burden of
proof by demonstrating that either the surveillance location was still in use
or that a member of the public would face the risk of retaliation if the
location was revealed.164 If this happened and the lower court determined
that the State‘s interest outweighed Church‘s interest, then Church‘s
conviction would stand and the State would not have to shoulder the
expense of a second trial.165 In this sense, the limited remand may be
perceived as a useful tool for facilitating judicial economy. In Gill v.
State,166 the prosecution supported its position that a limited remand was an
appropriate remedy by making such an argument.167 The court responded
by stating that ―the State made the rather dubious claim that a restricted
remand is advisable because it lessens the amount of time spent in
litigation . . . we do not feel that the limited remand device in any
significant manner would promote this result.‖168 The Gill court concluded
that ―[i]f anything, it potentially has the opposite effect—a proliferation of
litigation.‖169 The court further emphasized that it ―can never allow
expediency to overshadow the necessary and desirable procedures which
have long been established and followed to protect an accused.‖170 It
appears that the Church majority unwisely let this principle go
unrecognized.
D. The Court’s Decision in This Case Highlights that Maryland’s
Standard for Issuing a Limited Remand Is Unclear and Must Be

purpose of allowing the State to reopen the motion hearing to present additional evidence.‖ Id.;
see also Jay S. Blumenkopf, The Motion In Limine: An Effective Procedural Device with No
Material Downside Risk, 16 NEW ENG. L. REV. 171, 174 (1981) (―The motion in limine is similar
to and believed to have evolved from the pretrial criminal motion to suppress illegally obtained
evidence.‖).
162. 371 Md. at 112, 807 A.2d at 24.
163. Church, 408 Md. at 676, 971 A.2d at 295.
164. See id. at 672, 971 A.2d at 292–93 (majority opinion) (explaining how the limited remand
would work).
165. Id. at 673, 971 A.2d 293.
166. 265 Md. 350, 289 A.2d 575 (1972).
167. Id. at 360, 289 A.2d at 580.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
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Revised to Ensure that It Is Applied Consistently and Not Used to
Compromise Defendants’ Fair Trial Rights
The two key sources of law governing the applicability of limited
remands in criminal cases each contain ambiguities that allow courts to use
the remedy without sufficient restriction.171 First, the State rule governing
remands states that a remand may be used when ―the substantial merits of a
case will not be determined by affirming, reversing or modifying the
judgment, or [when] justice will be served by permitting further
proceedings.‖172 This vague standard, requiring only that ―justice will be
served,‖ gives courts considerable discretion when deciding to use the
remedy because the standard does not set forth clear guidelines controlling
its applicability.173 The second source of ambiguity stems from the Court
of Appeals‘s decision in Gill v. State, explaining that limited remands may
be used in criminal cases to ―correct procedures subsidiary to the criminal
trial.‖174 This interpretation adds some guidance to the standard given
under Rule 8-604(d), but ambiguity remains, as it may not always be clear
whether the error being corrected by the limited remand relates to the
substantive issues of the case or to a ―subsidiary‖ issue. The lack of a clear
standard permits courts to use the limited remand to avoid the expense of a
new trial even in cases where the defendant‘s fair trial rights were
violated.175 In this case, the error that the limited remand was ordered to
correct related to the defendant‘s Sixth Amendment right to cross-examine
the witnesses appearing against him.176 A violation of a defendant‘s
constitutional fair trial rights impacts the determination of the defendant‘s
guilt.177 Under the current standard governing the use of the limited
remand, however, there is no bright line rule to indicate whether this issue
is subsidiary to the substantive issues of the trial, and thus the Court of
Appeals was able to avoid ordering defendant Church a new trial.178 The
legislature might improve this situation by adding a provision to Rule 8171. See MD. R. 8-604(d) (allowing the use of a remand when ―justice will be served by
permitting further proceedings‖); see also Gill, 265 Md. at 357, 289 A.2d at 579 (holding that
limited remands may only be used to correct errors made in ―procedures subsidiary to the criminal
trial,‖ though not defining ―subsidiary‖).
172. MD. R. 8-604(d).
173. See id. (failing to explain in detail when ―justice will be served‖).
174. 265 Md. at 357, 289 A.2d at 579.
175. Church v. State, 408 Md. 650, 674, 971 A.2d 280, 294 (2009) (Greene, J., dissenting).
176. Id. at 672–73, 971 A.2d at 292–93 (majority opinion).
177. See id. at 676, 971 A.2d at 295 (Greene, J., dissenting) (―[The court] cannot say beyond a
reasonable doubt that the improper restriction placed on Church‘s right of cross-examination in no
way influenced the jury‘s verdict.‖).
178. See id. at 672, 971 A.2d at 292 (majority opinion) (ordering only a limited remand).
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604(d) stating that the limited remand may never be used to correct an error
that violated a defendant‘s constitutional rights.
V. CONCLUSION
In Church v. State, the Court of Appeals held that a surveillance
location privilege exists that allows undercover police officers to refuse to
disclose the location of their observation posts at trial, but that before it can
be applied, the State must demonstrate that it has a legitimate interest in
concealing the location that outweighs the defendant‘s interest in freely
cross-examining his or her accusers.179 The court additionally held that in
this case, defense counsel preserved the surveillance location privilege issue
for appeal because he ―voiced clearly‖ his objection to the motion in
limine.180 In holding that a qualified surveillance location privilege exists,
the court crafted a rule that adequately protects defendants‘ fair trial rights
under the Confrontation Clause.181 The court also correctly held that
defense counsel‘s conduct was sufficiently vigorous to preserve the
surveillance location privilege issue for appeal.182 The court erred,
however, in issuing a limited remand, and that error underscores the need to
clarify the guidelines governing the use of that remedy.183 The enactment
of a bright line rule indicating when the use of a limited remand is
permissible would help protect criminal defendants‘ fair trial rights.184

179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Id. at 672–73, 971 A.2d at 292–93.
Id. at 661, 971 A.2d at 286.
See supra Part IV.A.
See supra Part IV.B.
See supra Part IV.C–D.
See supra Part IV.D.

